From 584d8d4cb3d4eab7595650209511abbd4ba49eb6 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: River <shibedrill1@gmail.com>
Date: Thu, 22 May 2025 18:55:07 -0400
Subject: [PATCH] Add Hardening

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+# System Hardening
+
+A number of different methods are employed to make HalogenOS more resistant to exploits and tampering, and are explained below.
+
+## Build Settings
+
+These are configurations performed during the compilation stage. All the settings here apply strictly to binaries which ship within the HalogenOS image, not to binaries downloaded via Flatpak or Distrobox.
+
+- Gentoo hardened compiler & flags
+- SELinux support included
+- X11 and systemd support disabled
+
+## Kernel
+
+The kernel has been configured to utilize several security features that limit what APIs processes can use and which side channels might be available to leak information.
+
+- Kernel Self Protection Project enabled
+- Signed kernel module loading only
+- Quiet boot parameter
+- Common CPU vulnerabilities mitigated
+- Lockdown mode set to confidentiality
+- SELinux enabled
+- Unnecessary modules blacklisted
+
+## Full Verified Boot
+
+If the hardware running HalogenOS is properly manufactured and configured, it should provide a reasonably strong guarantee that software on the system is in a known good state.
+
+- Checks & reports on hardware/firmware security
+- Unified Kernel Image boot
+- Secure Boot with locally generated keys
+- dm-verity enabled for system partition
+- squashfs based system images
+- LUKS encryption enabled for user partition
+- TPM2 based automatic unlocking
+- Automatic repair in case of tampering
+- User alerted if hardware security baseline changes
+
+## Configuration
+
+Various controls on the kernel's networking stack, filesystem stack, and on some userland components like malloc further reduce attack surface.
+
+- Hardened sysctl values
+- hardened_malloc used by default
+- `nosuid` set for non-system partitions
+- `noexec` set for `/tmp`
+- Root logon disabled
+- No superuser access on production builds
+- sshd disabled
+
+## Updates
+
+System updates are fully verified as well. In a secure build, signatures are required and the system will not install an unsigned or improperly signed update or overlay.
+
+- Signed image updates
+- Signed system overlays
+- Updates performed over HTTPS
+
+## Sandboxing
+
+Applications are run in sandboxes by default so they do not make undesired modifications or read files without authorization.
+
+- Flatpak centered package management
+- Distrobox with gvisor for container work
+- Hardened Docker configuration
+- BubbleWrap for arbitrary binary sandboxing
+
+## Applications
+
+The default applications have been selected with security as a first priority.
+
+- GNOME desktop environment
+- Wayland display compositor
+- Trivalent browser